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Abstract
Psychometric measures of ability are unsuited to computa-
tional descriptions of tasks, primarily because they cannot take
process into account. Studies of aptitude–treatment interac-
tions have often failed to replicate from task to task precisely
because of this difficulty. The current study aligns psycho-
metric measures with process accounts in the domain of mul-
timodal reasoning. Learning from multimodal logic courses
transfers to other reasoning tasks, and this transfer has been
found to relate to differences in strategic use of graphical rep-
resentations in proof construction. The current study is a repli-
cation and an extension of these findings. Different goal types
are distinguished in terms of: their modality; whether they in-
volve proofs of consequence or non-consequence; and whether
they can be solved by constructing single or multiple cases.
We report on the interaction of a range of psychometric mea-
sures, and the ways in which they relate to the development
and deployment of strategies. In particular, students who de-
velop coping strategies to overcome difficulties with certain
problems find that these strategies arise at the expense of ap-
propriate use of a variety of strategies. Our approach, which
characterises goals in terms of their logical as well as phenom-
enal properties, supports a computational perspective on psy-
chometric measures in reasoning tasks.
Introduction
The process of learning to construct formal proofs combin-
ing diagrammatic and sentential representations provides a
unique microcosm for investigating aptitude–treatment inter-
actions (ATIs) based on different representational behaviours
(Stenning, Cox & Oberlander, 1995). The formality of the
representations and processes offers the possibility of pro-
ducing computational models of the mental processes in-
volved. Psychometric approaches which posit no accounts of
the mental processes which underly their measurements not
only block connections to cognitive accounts of mental pro-
cess, but frequently lead to failure to replicate ATIs (Cron-
bach & Snow, 1977). Transfer of scientific theory from situa-
tion to situation is dependent on accounts of underlying struc-
ture and process—just like transfer of students’ learning.
This paper seeks to replicate and extend earlier work on
ATIs in learning logic from Hyperproof (HP), a multimodal
proof environment due to Barwise and Etchemendy (1994).
The HP interface is shown in Figure 1. The top of the main
window displays a graphical situation. Below the situation
are sentential statements that refer to the graphical situation.
The other windows indicate goals for which the student has
to construct proofs—in this example, there are four differ-
ent goals, one sentential and three graphical. Graphical sit-
uations can contain abstraction in several ways: size (small,
Figure 1: The Hyperproof interface—Problem 4.
medium, large) and shape (tetrahedron, cube, dodecahedron)
can be left unspecified via cylinders and bags, respectively;
and position of blocks in the situation can be left unspecified
by blocks appearing off the board.
An earlier study (Stenning, Cox & Oberlander, 1995) re-
vealed that scores on a subscale of the Graduate Record Exam
(GRE) analytical reasoning test predicted outcomes of learn-
ing supported by HP with or without its diagrammatic com-
ponent. Students were classified into high and low scoring on
the constraint satisfaction problems of this test. For students
taught a 10 week course with HP, those that scored high on
the GRE pre-test showed pre- to post-test improvement on a
‘blocks-world’ (BW) test (see Methods section for a descrip-
tion of this test), whereas those that scored low on the GRE
pre-test actually showed decrements on the BW test. These
results were reversed when the teaching was a 10 week con-
ventional logic course taught using only the sentential com-
ponent of HP. Subsequent analysis of the logs of the proofs
these students produced in their exams showed that the two
groups displayed contrasting proof structures on some prob-
lems. These problems were characterised, as predicted, on
computational grounds, by the use of a high degree of graph-
ical abstraction (Oberlander et al., 1996).
Monaghan & Stenning (1998) replicated this ATI in the do-
main of syllogistic reasoning. Subjects who scored high on
the GRE constraint satisfaction problems learned a graphical
method for solving syllogisms with fewer errors and greater
ease than their lower scoring counterparts. Teaching with a
method that was based on sentential natural deduction re-
versed the effect. The study also showed that other tests of
spatial ability correlated with difficulties at different stages of
syllogistic reasoning. Thus, in these two domains of study,
representation and strategy have been shown to inter-relate:
the interplay of style and modality is an important factor in
learning to solve reasoning tasks.
As well as aiming to replicate these previous studies with
a different student population, we had two further goals. The
first was to examine the relationship between several estab-
lished psychometric measures that deal with ‘spatial’ and
‘verbal’ processing, and a multimodal reasoning environ-
ment. The second was to deepen our understanding of the
dimensions of proof strategy which distinguish students with
different reasoning styles.
The earlier study revealed systematic differences in the use
of graphical abstraction on one indeterminate exam problem.
Here we seek to explore the effects of goal-types in HP dif-
fering in (i) modality (sentential versus graphical); (ii) con-
sequentiality (versus non-consequentiality); and (iii) multi-
plicity of required cases (versus the possibility of a single
case being sufficient). For a given goal, there is a range of
proof methods available. This classification of goal types and
proof methods enables a controlled examination of strategic
flexibility in choice of proof methods. The relative contribu-
tions of representational and strategic differences is an impor-
tant issue in the psychometrics of reasoning (see for instance
Roberts, 1998), as is the issue of flexibility of approach for
psychometrics more generally (Guilford, 1980).
Method
84 students registered on a philosophy degree at the Univer-
sity of Gothenberg participated in the experiment. They fol-
lowed the HP course material (Barwise & Etchemendy, 1994)
as part of a course on introductory logic. The HP coursework
was done in parallel with the students learning from more tra-
ditional sources: in particular, they learned a traditional natu-
ral deduction method of proof (Bennet, Haglund, Westersta˚hl
& So¨nstro¨d, 1997), which was based on Mates’ (1965) natu-
ral deduction method.
At the end of the course, students were set six problems
in Hyperproof, which they were free to solve in their own
time. These problems were designed to be ‘indeterminate’,
containing a high degree of abstraction in the graphics. One
exam question (no. 4) was the same as one used in the original
HP study. Proofs were computer-logged, providing detailed
data on temporal and ordinal aspects of proof construction.
The students sat a range of pre-tests and one post-test vol-
untarily. The number of students participating in each stage
varied (see Results section).
Pre- and post-course tests
Pre- and post-course tests were used in order to replicate and
extend the original HP studies. The same tests as were used
in the first HP study were administered, but in addition we
use other psychometric measures that are relevant to spatial
and verbal information processing.
The GRE test was the same as that used in the first HP
study. The test has two types of problem: ‘analytical’ items
(GREA) are those where the construction of a diagram is use-
ful – these are the constraint satisfaction problems where a
model can be constructed from the information; and verbal
reasoning items (GREV) which require argument analysis,
and assessment of the similarity of arguments. For these ver-
bal items, several models may be consistent with the given in-
formation. For more details on this test see Cox et al. (1996).
As a measure of transfer of reasoning skills, the Blocks’
World test was administered. This is a paper and pencil test
which requires students to reason about situations similar to
those presented in HP but with natural language descriptions
of the conditions on those situations. Different versions of
this test were given both before and after the course.
To measure ‘spatial ability’, the paper folding test (PFT)
(French, Ekstrom & Price, 1963) was used. This requires the
participant to decide on the array of holes resulting from a
piece of paper being folded in various ways, having a hole
punched in it, and then unfolded again. This can be inter-
preted as a measure of strategic flexibility in using spatial in-
formation, rather than reflecting spatial ability per se (Kyllo-
nen & Lohman, 1983).
Students also took the embedded figures test (EFT). This
requires the student to locate geometrical figures in a rect-
angle of crossing lines. Students who perform well on this
task are classified as field-independent, those who perform
less well are field-dependent (Witkin et al., 1971). Field-
independent students are more likely to process information
independently from the context, whereas field-dependent stu-
dents are more likely to take the context into account.
All tests were set in English, and students were classified
according to a median-split on each of the pre-tests.
Results and Discussion
61 students did the EFT and the PFT, 57 students did the pre-
course BW test, and 59 students did the GRE test; 72 students
completed the HP exam problems; and 27 students did the
BW post-course test. Some of the HP records were lost due
to bugs in the logging program, so n-values vary throughout
the analyses. Full data for all questions and pre-tests exists
for 39 students.
Correlations between the pre-test measures (shown in
Table 11) were in accord with the literature (Jonassen &
Grabowski, 1993): the two subscales of the GRE are corre-
lated; GREA correlates with EFT and PFT scores; and EFT
and PFT show a significant, but slight, correlation.
These pre-test measure correlations indicate that the group
is representative of a general student population. Analyses of
1Numbers in parentheses are the degrees of freedom.  indicates
two-tailed significance p  0.05.
Table 1: Correlations between pre-tests.
GREV EFT PFT
GREA 0.30  (57) 0.34  (55) 0.27  (55)
GREV 0.22 (55) 0.22 (55)
EFT 0.26  (59)
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Figure 2: Change in BW score by GREA group.
the differences in generalising from and differences in reason-
ing within HP are now reported.
Transfer from HP
To relate the current study to existing results from the origi-
nal HP experiment, the ‘transfer’ of reasoning skills from the
course to the BW test was measured. Students were divided
by a median split into those that scored high and those that
scored low on the GREA subscale. Figure 2 illustrates the re-
lationship between pre- and post-test score and GREA group.
As with the original study, those scoring high on the GREA
subscale benefitted more from following the HP course (t(23)
= 1.80, one-tailed p  0.05).
Strategies within HP
The original HP studies reported two different responses
to graphical abstraction in HP, which related to the GREA
groups. GREA high scoring students use more abstraction in
their proofs, whereas GREA low students utilise highly con-
crete situations as they solve the problems. These different
strategies were found only on HP problems that contained
graphical abstraction (Figure 1 shows an indeterminate prob-
lem (no. 4)). As the exam in the current study was delib-
erately designed to consist only of this sort of problem, we
expected a similar dichotomy of strategies to emerge.
The strategies observed in the original HP study can be dis-
tinguished by the proportion of fully concrete as opposed to
abstract graphical situations that the student creates in a proof
(Monaghan, 1998). GREA high students’ proofs have more
abstract situations, GREA low students’ proofs have more
concrete situations. However, this distinction does not pre-
dict different proofs in the current study. The GREA highs
use fully concrete situations 40% of the time, GREA lows
construct concrete situations 37% of the time. However, the
EFT scores did seem to reflect this stylistic difference better:
EFT high scoring students used concrete situations 32% of
the time, compared to EFT low scoring students’ 51% use,
which is significantly more (t(51) = 2.29, p  0.05).
It may be that the EFT is a better indicator of this strate-
gic difference for this population – answering the GRE test
in a second language may mean that scores also reflect lan-
guage competence. It might be expected that the EFT and
the GREA correlate, and in the current study this is the case.
However, in the syllogistic study reported earlier (Monaghan
& Stenning, 1998) no correlation was found between these
measures for native English speakers (r(20) = 0.03, p  0.8),
and in the current study transfer of ability to the BW test was
not found to improve more for one EFT group over the other
(t(23) = 0.11, p  0.9).
Differences in the observed strategies used in HP may also
be due to differences in teaching in the current study, which
combined sentential and multimodal teaching. In the original
HP study, when sentential materials alone were used to teach
logic, the GREA low group transferred reasoning skills better
to the BW test.
This complicated mixture of success and failure to repli-
cate at the level of psychometric tests has bedevilled the ATI
literature (see Cronbach & Snow, 1977, for a review). Spa-
tial ability, for example, has been variously defined as ability
for the “encoding, transformation, and recognition of spatial
information” (Salthouse et al., 1990). The measure suffers
from even less precision when strategic variation is consid-
ered. Kyllonen & Lohman (1983) show that such tests as the
PFT are solved by some students with strategies that seem
to invoke representations that are not spatial. This has led
Roberts (1998) to consider such measures from the perspec-
tive of strategic variation and change, arguing that it is these
patterns of strategic variation and change which characterise
the psychometric measures.
Our response is to look for more principled ways of
analysing proof styles which have clearer relations to com-
putational processes. Ultimately, theoretically motivated pro-
cess accounts of proof styles and an account of how they gen-
eralise across tasks should replace unprincipled test scores.
For the present, the psychometric scores provide some em-
pirical reassurance of general applicability. We had expanded
the indeterminate problems in the exam used in the present
study precisely so that we could explore styles more system-
atically. HP offers an environment where the student’s pref-
erence for expressing information within a particular modal-
ity can be assessed; where the transfer of information be-
tween modalities can be plotted; and where variation of proof
method with problem type can be explored.
In order to explore the issue of strategic flexibility within
HP we need two classifications: of goal-types and of proof
methods. HP problems can pose a number of goals that have
to be solved with reference to one situation. These goals
vary in terms of modality: the goal can be about a graphical
state of affairs, or about a sentential statement (G- or S-goal).
Within the graphical modality, goals can vary as to whether
the requirement is to prove that a particular situation is a con-
sequence of the given information (graphical-consequence:
GC-goal), or to prove that the situation is not a consequence
of the given information (graphical-non-consequence: GN-
goal). Finally, the GC-goals can be distinguished between
those that require splitting into multiple situations in order
to reach the conclusion (GCM-goal), and those that can be
achieved by applying sentential information to a single graph-
ical situation (GCS-goal). In HP, the former are usually those
that require the position of blocks to be decided (though prob-
lem 4 illustrated in Figure 1 is an exception). The latter re-
quire the shape or size of the shape to be determined. In prob-
lem 4 (Figure 1), goal 4 is an S-goal, goals 1 and 3 are GN-
goals, and goal 2 is a GCM goal.
Having chosen a classification of goals, we also need a
classification of proof-methods so that we can explore how
problem-type and learning style combine to determine proof
method. HP is designed to teach ‘proof-by-cases’. All goal
types can be achieved by constructing a number of graphi-
cal situations (cases) and using sentential or graphical rules
to prove or exclude the goal for each case. Using fewer sit-
uations reflects the use of more abstraction in the way the
situations are characterised. This suggests the use of number
of cases as a general structural index of proof method. We
first seek some empirical support for this measure.
When the pattern of situations that the students produced
in their HP proofs was examined more closely, one striking
feature emerged: some students used very few graphical sit-
uations in their proofs. For one problem in particular (in fact
no. 4, the question from the original study), all steps in these
students’ proofs were rules that operated on sentential infor-
mation in the sentential window of HP. These proofs main-
tained the maximum level of abstraction, and so can be seen
as being the extreme case of the graphical proof that invokes
abstract graphical situations. Thus, three types of proof are
distinguishable in the current study, and they can be located,
not in terms of abstract or concrete graphical situation con-
struction, but in terms of the mean level of concreteness of
the proof. For question 4, where instances of the ‘sentential’
strategy occur, mean concreteness and EFT score are signifi-
cantly related (r(49) = 0.35, p  0.02).
Students were classified as using one of these three proof-
types on problem 4, and pre-test scores were compared for
these three groups. The results are shown in Table 2.
On semantic grounds, the three strategies constitute points
on a continuum—sentential proofs are merely more abstract
proofs which happen to be in a different modality. This
continuum is reflected in EFT and PFT scores. Those stu-
dents producing more abstract proofs independent of modal-
ity, have high EFT and PFT scores, and they better transfer
learned reasoning skills to the post-course BW test. The dif-
ferences in EFT score between the two extremes of abstrac-
tion/concreteness are significantly different (t(44) = 2.65,
p  0.02). The group including both sentential and abstract
graphical strategies scored higher on the EFT than the con-
crete graphical strategy group (t(49) = 2.64, p  0.02). How-
ever, the EFT score for the graphical abstract group alone did
not differ significantly from either other strategy group. The
ordering of EFT scores across the three proof methods helps
Table 2: Pre-test scores for students classified by three strate-
gies for Problem 4.
Pre-test Strategy
sentential abstract concrete
graphical graphical
GREA 5.00 4.25 4.67
GREV 2.00 1.75 2.97
EFT 19.10 16.40 12.56
PFT 13.50 12.80 12.36
BW improvement 1.50 1.00 0.76
justify the use of the number of situations generated in a proof
as an index of proof methods across problems.
The modality independence constituted by sentential proof
is consonant with the EFT being a measure of field-
dependence–field-independence. When information is pre-
sented graphically, students who are more field independent
(scoring high on the EFT) are more able to represent that
information abstracted from the context it is presented in
(Witkin et al., 1971).
This classification of proof methods applied only to the
data of problem 4 does not reveal any relation to GRE scores.
However, relations reappear when the two classifications of
goal-type and proof method are applied to all the data.
Proof methods analysed by goal-types
For each goal type, the number of situations used to achieve
the goal was analysed. Two-way ANOVAs were carried out,
with number of situations used for each type of goal as a
repeated measure and median splits on the pre-tests (EFT,
PFT, GREA, GREV) as between-subjects variables. Using
these analyses, strategic approach to the different types of
goal can be assessed and related to the pre-tests. Three differ-
ent ANOVAs were carried out: G-goals compared to S-goals;
GC-goals compared to GN-goals; and GCM-goals compared
to GCS-goals. Only results reaching significance are reported
below. Between-subjects effects indicate whether the pre-test
alone distinguishes overall differences in the number of situ-
ations used to achieve the goals; within-subjects effects mea-
sure the interaction between goal type and the pre-tests.
Sentential & Graphical goals
Between subjects effects that proved significant are shown in
the first part of Table 3.
This analysis shows that the number of situations used to
solve the goals is sensitive to several of the pre-test measures.
Those that score higher on the PFT use fewer situations to
solve the goals. Those that score higher on both the EFT
and the PFT use fewer situations than those that score lower
Table 3: Comparing S and G goals: between-subjects effects
and within-subjects effects.
Pre-test(s) Between-subjects effects
PFT F(1, 25) = 8.31, p  0.01
EFT by PFT F(1, 25) = 13.01, p  0.005
EFT by GRE-A F(1, 25) = 7.05, p  0.02
PFT by GRE-V F(1, 25) = 7.49, p  0.02
GRE-A by GRE-V F(1, 25) = 4.74, p  0.05
EFT by PFT by GRE-V F(1, 25) = 6.40, p  0.02
EFT by GRE-A by GRE-V F(1, 25) = 7.61, p  0.02
Pre-test(s) Within-subjects effects
goal type F(1, 25) = 176.99, p  0.001
EFT by goal-type F(1, 25) = 4.24, p  0.05
PFT by goal-type F(1, 25) = 4.99, p  0.05
EFT by PFT by goal-type F(1, 25) = 7.04, p  0.02
PFT by GRE-V by goal-type F(1, 25) = 4.74, p  0.05
Table 4: Mean number of situations for goal type by PFT and
GREV.
S-goal PFT Lo PFT Hi
GREV Lo 10.08 4.89
GREV Hi 7.25 7.33
G-goal PFT Lo PFT Hi
GREV Lo 37.63 20.88
GREV Hi 25.25 29.00
on one or both of these measures. However, there is not a
simple association between high test scores and efficiency in
situation use, as measuring the overall proof length alone is
unrelated to any of the psychometric scores.
The second part of Table 3 displays within-subjects effects
and these results indicate that students that score differently
on the pre-test differ in their solutions for each of the goal
types. Both EFT Hi students and PFT Hi students use fewer
situations for each type of goal. Here high ability on these
measures relates to using fewer situations, but the interac-
tion of PFT by GREV on goal-type points to a more stylis-
tic variation, and one that is glossed over when only a single
psychometric is used to distinguish response. Table 4 shows
the mean number of situations used for each goal type dis-
tinguished by PFT and GREV. There are similar interactions
for both types of goal: PFT Hi students use fewer situations
for each goal type, but this is modulated by GREV group. If
the student is in the GREV high group, then it doesn’t mat-
ter which PFT group they are in: they use the same number
of situations for each goal type. If the student scores low on
the GREV, then being PFT Lo means a large number of sit-
uations are used for each goal, and being PFT Hi means that
the fewest situations are used for each goal.
Students who score high on the GREV scale are those who
are good at solving problems that do not require breaking into
cases. Scoring high on this scale means that flexibility in us-
ing graphical representations (measured by the PFT scale) is
irrelevant. Scoring low on the GREV means that students
who are good at using graphical representations to support
reasoning (PFT Hi) utilise the graphical abstraction facilities
of HP to their full potential. Those who are low on both scales
rely more on concretising the problem’s information.
Graphical goals: consequence & non-consequence
For between-subjects effects, the results were identical to the
S- and G-goal analysis. EFT Hi and PFT Hi students used
fewer situations for both types of problem. However, the only
within-subjects effect was for goal-type: in general, students
use more situations for GC-goals than for GN-goals, and no
interaction between goal type and the pre-tests emerged. This
lack of effect is due to the small amount of variation in the
strategy used to solve GN-goals. Most students solve them by
constructing two situations that differ in terms of the feature
in question.
Graphical consequence goals: multiple & single case
When different types of GC-goal are distinguished, different
approaches to the goals are highlighted by the pre-tests. Table
5 indicates the between-subjects and within-subjects effects.
Table 5: Comparing GCM and GCS goals: between-subjects
effects and within-subjects effects.
Pre-test(s) Between-subjects effects
PFT F(1, 25) = 4.43, p  0.05
EFT by PFT F(1, 25) = 9.38, p  0.01
EFT by GREA F(1, 25) = 4.83, p  0.05
PFT by GREV F(1, 25) = 4.47, p  0.05
EFT by PFT by GREV F(1, 25) = 6.94, p  0.02
EFT by GREA by GREV F(1, 25) = 6.55, p  0.02
Pre-test(s) Within-subjects effects
goal-type F(1, 25) = 42.98, p  0.001
EFT by PFT by goal-type F(1, 25) = 8.55, p  0.01
PFT by GREA by goal-type F(1, 25) = 4.55, p  0.05
EFT by PFT by GREV F(1, 25) = 7.15, p  0.02
by goal-type
EFT by GREA by GREV F(1, 25) = 8.52, p  0.01
by goal-type
Again, those with high scores on the EFT and PFT use
the fewest number of situations for GC-goals. For within-
subjects effects, a different pattern emerges to that found for
S- and G-goals. There is an interaction of PFT by GREA by
goal-type, and this indicates different approaches to the two
types of goal.
For GCM goals, those that score low on the GREA but
high on the PFT use the fewest situations (see Table 6). For
GCS goals, these are the students that use the most situations.
GCS goals can be solved by using one situation that indi-
cates the sentential information being applied to the graphical
situation. Alternatively, they can be solved by constructing
multiple situations that explore the constraints. Those stu-
dents that effectively exploit graphical abstractions in solv-
ing the GCM problems seem to maintain this strategy when
a shorter solution is available. The GREA low scoring sub-
jects are those that are poorer at solving problems where one
model can be constructed. These are exactly the GCS-goals.
The current analysis suggests that these students have learned
a coping strategy for such problems which is not efficient,
but it does at least achieve the result, and being flexible in
using graphical representations enables the development of
this strategy. Students who are GREA low but do not learn
Table 6: Mean number of situations for goal type by PFT and
GREA.
GCM-goal PFT Lo PFT Hi
GREA Lo 13.40 9.86
GREA Hi 12.33 10.89
GCS-goal PFT Lo PFT Hi
GREA Lo 1.15 2.00
GREA Hi 1.71 1.21
this coping strategy—due to being less able to exploit graphi-
cal abstraction—do not experience this interference effect on
GCS problems. Those students that score highest on both
scales seem to choose optimal strategies: their proofs for the
GCM goals are not so short, but when they come across GCS
goals, they can recognise and use a more appropriate strategy.
This reflects flexible use of the graphical abstraction facilities
and recognition of differing proof constraints.
Conclusions
The current study replicates the transfer effects of learning
logic in a multimodal environment to other reasoning do-
mains, but the strategic differences previously observed do
not emerge in the same way. This is due, in part, to differ-
ences in the teaching method which provides extra encour-
agement for using sentential representations to solve logical
problems. This gives rise to three types of strategy: senten-
tial, graphical abstract and graphical concrete, which form a
continuum in terms of the extent to which they utilise HP’s
graphical abstraction facilities.
Distinguishing different goal types in HP offers a win-
dow into flexible strategic change and the inter-relationship
of multiple psychometric measures. No one psychometric
captures strategic variation in using graphical abstraction in
HP, but combinations reflect the options open to students.
If psychometrics index cognitive style, then cognitive style
dictates the development of strategies in solving multimodal
problems. It is this chaining that reflects the observations of
strategic variation and change being related to purported mea-
sures of ‘spatial ability’. A student’s propensity for solving
problems in a certain way is tempered or licenced by their
ability to use representations to achieve the goal. Some stu-
dents develop strategies that counteract their difficulty with
particular problem types, but these can then result in an in-
flexibility of approach. Those students who seem flexible in
their strategies in HP do not necessarily use these strategies
optimally, but their ability to switch strategy according to the
problem’s constraints makes up for this.
The highlighting of strategic variation and change in the
current study enables a recharacterisation of the psychomet-
ric measures which takes into account the computational fea-
tures of the task. Thus, HP offers a window into what the
psychometrics mean from the computational perspective. Be-
cause HP is based on a principled (if highly abstract) theory of
reasoning, its categories can be applied to understanding per-
formance on tests such as the GRE. For example, ‘splitting
into cases’ is something that has to be achieved in reasoning,
whether in a formal domain, or in more informal problem
solving.
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